Why Rules Fail: Institutional Roots of Non-Compliance in Mexico’s Small-Scale Shark Fishery

Abstract

Small-scale fisheries management is a critical challenge for global fisheries sustainability. This study diagnoses the institutional failures behind overexploitation and regulatory non-compliance in Mexico’s shark-cazón fishery (predominantly Rhizoprionodon terraenovae). Using the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework and Ostrom’s Social-Ecological Systems (SES) approach, we assessed the catch series (1976–2014) and institutional robustness. Results show a 77% surplus over the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY), with an average catch of 51,417 tonnes per year against a biological limit of 29,040 tonnes. The diagnosis reveals undefined access limits, exclusively state-run monitoring, sanctions provided for in law but not applied participatorily, and the absence of local conflict-resolution mechanisms. These findings suggest that overexploitation is not an inevitable biological failure but the outcome of a command-and-control design that inhibits collective action and erodes rule legitimacy. This study contributes to the common-pool resource governance literature by extending Ostrom’s framework and Hønneland’s compliance model to a previously underrepresented Latin American elasmobranch context. Based on this diagnosis, we recommend transitioning toward polycentric governance—with nested community monitoring, effectively enforced graduated sanctions, and local conflict-resolution mechanisms—as a strategy for improving regulatory compliance in data-limited fisheries.

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