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Journal Article

Asymmetry in information acquisition—Exploring the principal–agent dyad of sport organizations and sport management higher education institutions

Olivia Wohlfart; Sandy Adam; Gregor Hovemann
German Journal of Exercise and Sport Research · Vol. 51, Issue 3 · pp. 344-353 · 2021

Abstract

This study is based on a metaphorical contract in sport management, whereby sport organizations (the principal) engage sport management higher education institutions (the agent) in qualifying graduates according to industry demands. There is asymmetry in the contract due to the lack of incentives for the principal to provide specific information and the agent’s ignorance about this information. A third party can acquire crucial information that sport management higher education institutions need to fulfil the contract. Based on a qualitative content analysis of 12 interviews with sport organization representatives, the study finds that sport management higher education institutions need to focus on either developing generic competencies or credibly signalling the value of sport management-specific competencies in their curriculum in order to efficiently fulfil the contract.

Bibliographic Information

JournalGerman Journal of Exercise and Sport Research
PublisherSpringer
Publication Date2021-09-01
Publication Year2021
Volume51
Issue3
Pages344-353
Document TypeJournal Article
Print ISSN2509-3142
eISSN2509-3150
DOI10.1007/s12662-021-00722-w

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NARA Access Coverage1971-01-01~Current
Journal Homepagehttps://www.springer.com/journal/12662
Publisher PageOpen Publisher Page
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